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ci.2012.0Abstract Difﬁe and Hellman ﬁrst invented the public key cryptosystem (PKC) wherein the public
key infrastructure (PKI) is used for the management of public keys; however, the PKI-based cryp-
tosystems suffer from heavy management trouble of public keys and certiﬁcates. An alternative
solution to the PKI is Shamir’s identity-based cryptosystems (IBC), which eliminate the need of
public key certiﬁcates; however, the most important shortcoming of IBC is the key escrow problem.
To cope with these problems, Al-Riyami and Paterson proposed a novel scheme of certiﬁcateless
PKC (CL-PKC) by combining the advantages of PKI and IBC. Since then, several certiﬁcateless
signature schemes have been designed and most of them have been analyzed and proven insecure
against different types of adversaries. Besides, the researchers have given very less attention to
the certiﬁcateless strong designated veriﬁer signature (CL-SDVS) scheme. Therefore, we proposed
a CL-SDVS scheme using elliptic curve bilinear parings in this paper. Our scheme, which is prov-
ably secure in the random oracle model with the intractability of BDH and CDH assumptions, sup-
ports all desirable security necessities of the CL-SDVS scheme such as strongness, source hiding and
non-delegatability. The rigorous security analysis and comparison with others guarantee the better
performance of the proposed scheme.
ª 2012 King Saud University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Difﬁe and Hellman (1976) ﬁrst invented the public key crypto-
system (PKC) and after which a public key infrastructure8797369160; fax: +91 326
, haﬁzul.ism@gmail.com (SK
.P. Biswas).
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6.003(PKI) has been developed, where different methods are used
for generating and maintaining the public keys using the cor-
responding public key certiﬁcates. However, the PKI-based
cryptosystems mainly suffer from problems such as (1) the sen-
der must authenticate the public key of the receiver by verify-
ing the corresponding certiﬁcate prior to the communication,
thereby requiring additional computational cost; (2) PKI-
based systems have the serious problems of certiﬁcate creation,
storage, revocation, delivery, etc. These problems can prevail
over the identity-based cryptosystem (IBC) (Shamir, 1984),
which can avoid the need of public key certiﬁcate. In IBC, a
user’s identity is used as public key and a trusted third party
called PKG (private key generator) generates the correspond-
ing private key by binding the user’s identity and its ownier B.V. All rights reserved.
52 SK Haﬁzul Islam, G.P. Biswasprivate key. Although Shamir proposed a smartcard-based
digital signature scheme using IBC, no practical identity-based
encryption/decryption scheme (IBE) was devised. Boneh and
Franklin (2001) ﬁrst designed a practical IBE scheme in the
elliptic curve group (Miller, 1985; Koblitz, 1987) using bilinear
pairings. In IBE, a public key can be revoked easily by binding
the date to the public key (Boneh and Franklin, 2001), and
there is no need for the exchange of public keys before the
communication takes place. Despite the advantages of IBE,
the inherent problem, called private key escrow, makes it
unsuitable for real-life applications where privacy of users is
of great concern in all respects. In IBE, the assumption for a
PKG to be fully trusted is not possible for open networks. Be-
cause the PKG knows the private keys of all users, a malicious
PKG can impersonate any user in the system easily.
With the advantages of both IBE and PKI, Al-Riyami and
Paterson (2003) proposed the certiﬁcateless public key crypto-
system (CL-PKC) that has received a lot of attention in recent
years. The CL-PKC eliminates the private key escrow problem
of IBE and the need of public key certiﬁcate as found in PKI.
In CL-PKC, each user has a full private key that consists of
two secrets comprising the identity-based private key gener-
ated by PKG and the PKI-based private key chosen by the
user himself. The PKG has no ability to get access to the full
private key of the user, and thus the man-in-the-middle attack
is impossible by the dishonest PKG.
The designated veriﬁer signature (DVS) scheme (Jakobsson
et al., 1996) allows the original signer, Alice (say) to generate a
signature that only be veriﬁed by a designated veriﬁer Bob
(say). Further, in any DVS scheme, Bob can prove to a third
party that the signature was generated by Alice. As a result,
the public veriﬁcation of DVS scheme annihilates the signer’s
privacy protection. To meet this goal, another signature
scheme, called strong DVS (SDVS) has been proposed by
Jakobsson et al. in the same paper (Jakobsson et al., 1996).
In this scheme, Bob is unable to convince an outsider that
the signature was generated by Alice or himself. This is because
Bob can compute an identical signature that cannot be distin-
guished from the signatures created by Alice, and the private
key of Bob is strictly required in the veriﬁcation phase. It
means the SDVS scheme satisﬁes the strongness and repudia-
tion properties as required in other secure cryptosystems.
1.1. Literature review
Recently, several certiﬁcateless signature (CLS) schemes have
been proposed in the literature. The ﬁrst CLS scheme is pro-
posed by Al-Riyami and Paterson in their seminal paper (Al-
Riyami and Paterson, 2003), but the protocol is not secure
as demonstrated by Huang et al. (2005), and then they built
a model for the CLS scheme. Gorantla and Saxena (2005) pro-
posed a new efﬁcient and secure CLS scheme as they have
claimed, but Cao et al. (2006) proved that it could not resist
the public key replacement attack. Yum and Lee (2004) deﬁne
the new construction of the CLS scheme however, Hu et al.
(2006) demonstrated that the scheme was not secure against
the public key replacement attack. To remove the security ﬂaws
of Yum and Lee (2004), Hu et al. (2006) proposed an improved
CLS scheme. Two efﬁcient CLS schemes (Yap et al., 2006;
Choi et al., 2007) were also presented and their security is pro-
ven based on the model proposed in Huang’s et al. (2005), butZhang and Feng (2006) demonstrated that the former scheme
(Yap et al., 2006) was vulnerable to the public key replacement
attack. Zhang et al. (2006) proposed an improved CSL model
using the model proposed in (Huang et al., 2005). Xu et al.
(2008) proposed a CLS scheme for mobile wireless cyber-phys-
ical systems, and Chen et al. (2007) presented an efﬁcient and
secure CLS scheme for the environment where immediate
revocation of the public keys is required. Yang et al. (2007)
designed a certiﬁcateless universal designated veriﬁer signature
(CL-UDVS) scheme, which is proven to be secure in the ran-
dom oracle model (Bellare and Rogaway, 1993) against differ-
ent types of adversaries. However, Guozheng and Fan (2009)
showed that the Xu et al. (2008) scheme is vulnerable to a mali-
cious PKG attack and Yang et al. (2007) scheme is not secure
against the public key replacement and malicious PKGattacks.
Zhang and Zhang (2008) proposed an efﬁcient CLS scheme,
which is secure in the random oracle model based on the hard-
ness assumption of BDH problem whereas Li and Liu (2011)
proposed another CLS scheme and provided only informal
security analysis.
Recently, certiﬁcateless short signature schemes have re-
ceived great attention due to its shorter length. The short sig-
nature schemes are appropriate for low-bandwidth, low-
storage and low-computation environments such as bar-coded
digital signature on postage stamps. In 2006, Huang et al.
(2006) ﬁrst introduced the security notion and construction
of a certiﬁcateless short designated veriﬁer signature (CL-
sDVS) scheme with the intractability of Gap Bilinear Difﬁe–
Hellman (GBDH) problem (Boneh and Franklin, 2001) in
the random oracle model. Unfortunately, their scheme is vul-
nerable to malicious PKG attacks. Du and Wen (2007), and
Chen et al. (2008) proposed two CL-sDVS schemes based on
parings and analyzed that the schemes were provably secured.
However, Fan et al. (2009) proved that the scheme (Du and
Wen, 2007) did not resist the public key replacement attack
and then developed a modiﬁed scheme to improve the security
of the earlier scheme. Tso et al. (2011) and Choi et al. (2011)
independently proposed two provably secure CL-sDVS
schemes, but the latter scheme is proven vulnerable against
the public key replacement attack (Tian et al., 2011).
1.2. Motivations and contributions
Based on the pioneer work of Al-Riyami and Paterson (2003),
many of CLS and CL-short signature schemes have been pro-
posed in recent years; however, most of the previous schemes
cannot meet desired security and computation efﬁciency. From
the literature, it can be seen that the researchers have been gi-
ven very less attention to the certiﬁcateless strong designated
veriﬁer signature (CL-SDVS) scheme. In 2009, Hongzhen
and Qiaoyan proposed a CL-DVS scheme using pairings and
states that is secure against all adversaries, and satisﬁes all
the necessary properties of DVS scheme. However, the compu-
tation cost of the scheme is high as three parings and one par-
ing-based exponentiation computation are required for the
signature generation and veriﬁcation. Recently, Yang et al.
(2009) and Xiao et al. (2010) independently designed two
CL-SDVS schemes based on elliptic curve bilinear pairings.
However, Zhang and Xie (2011) analyzed that Xiao et al.
scheme is vulnerable to both the public key replacement and
malicious PKG attacks.
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ECC and bilinear pairings. The formal security analysis of
our scheme proves that it is strongly secure against various
adaptive chosen messages and identity adversaries in the ran-
dom oracle model. We also compared our scheme with a num-
ber of related CLS schemes in terms of security and
computation efﬁciency, and found improved performance.
1.3. Roadmap of the paper
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
describes some preliminaries and Section 3 describes the deﬁni-
tion and attack model of a CL-SDVS scheme. Section 4 ex-
plains the proposed CL-SDVS scheme and Section 5
discusses the formal security analysis of our scheme. The com-
parisons of the proposed scheme with other are presented in
Section 6 and, ﬁnally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Technical backgrounds
This section describes the concept of bilinear parings and some
related computational problems as required in the paper.
2.1. Bilinear pairings
Let Gq be an additive cyclic group with prime order q(qP 2
k),
Gm be a multiplicative group of the same prime order q. Let
e^ : Gq  Gq ! Gm be an admissible bilinear mapping that satis-
ﬁes the following properties:
 Bilinearity: The bilinear map e^ : Gq  Gq ! Gm is said to be
bilinear if for all P, Q 2 Gq and a; b2RZq; e^ðaP ; bQÞ ¼
e^ðP ;QÞab holds.
 Non-degeneracy: There exists P, Q 2 Gq such that
e^ðP ;QÞ–1m, where 1m is an identity element of Gm. Note
that the map e^ does not send all pairs in Gq · Gq to the iden-
tity in Gm that is if P is a generator of the group Gq then
e^ðP ; PÞ is a generator of the group Gm.
 Computability: There must be an efﬁcient algorithm, which
can compute e^ðP ;QÞ for all P, Q 2 Gq.
A bilinear map is called an admissible bilinear map if it satis-
ﬁes the three properties deﬁned above. In general,Gq is a groupof
points on an elliptic curve, andGm is amultiplicative subgroup of
a ﬁnite ﬁeldE/Fq. Themap e^will be derived either from themod-
iﬁedWeil pairing or from Tate pairing over a ﬁnite ﬁeld. A more
comprehensive description about bilinear pairings, selection of
suitable parameters, elliptic curves and these groups canbe found
in Boneh and Franklin (2001) for efﬁciency and security.
Bilinear Difﬁe–Hellman parameter generator (BDH-PG): A
BDH-PG G is deﬁned as a probabilistic polynomial time
bounded algorithm that takes the security parameter k 2 Zþ
as input and outputs a uniformly random tuple
ðq; e^;Gq;Gm;PÞ of bilinear parameters.
2.2. Complexity assumptions
In this section, we deﬁne the following computational prob-
lems, which are assumed hard to break by any polynomial time
bounded algorithm, on the elliptic curve group.Deﬁnition 1 (Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem
(ECDLP)). Given a random instance (P,Q) 2 Gq, ﬁnd an
integer a2RZq such that Q= aP.
Deﬁnition 2 (Computational Difﬁe–Hellman (CDH) prob-
lem). Given a random instance (P,aP,bP) 2 Gq for any
a; b2RZq, computation of abP is hard to the group Gq.
Deﬁnition 3 (Computational Difﬁe–Hellman (CDH) assump-
tion). A probabilistic polynomial time bounded adversary A
is said to break the CDH problem with negligible probability,
if for a given random instance (P,aP,bP) 2 Gq of the CDH
problem, where a; b2RZq are unknown to A, the advantage
AdvCDHA;Gq ¼ Pr AðP; aP; bPÞ ¼ abP : a; b2RZq
h i
ofA in solving
CDH problem is negligible.
Deﬁnition 4 (Bilinear Difﬁe–Hellman (BDH) problem). Given
a random instance (P,aP,bP,cP) 2 Gq and for any a; b; c2RZq,
it is impossible to compute e^ðP;PÞabc.
Deﬁnition 5 (Bilinear Difﬁe–Hellman (BDH) assumption). If
G is a BDH parameter generator, the polynomial time
bounded adversary A breaks the BDH problem with negligi-
ble probability, if for a given random instance (Gq,Gm,e, -
P,aP,bP,cP), where the tuple (Gq,Gm,e) is the output of the
BDH-PG G for sufﬁciently large security parameter
k 2 Zþ; ðP; aP; bP; cPÞ 2 Gq and a; b; c2RZq, then the advan-
tage AdvBDHG;A ðkÞ ¼ Pr
h
AðP; aP; bP; cPÞ ¼ e^ðP;PÞabc : a; b; c2R
Zq
i
of A in solving BDH problem is negligible.3. Model of CL-SDVS scheme
3.1. Deﬁnition of CL-SDVS scheme
In any CL-SDVS scheme, three entities are involved, namely
the PKG, a signer and a designated veriﬁer. The CL-SDVS
scheme consists of the following algorithms:
 Setup:It takes the security parameter k 2 Zþ as inputs and
then generates PKG’s master secret key msk and the sys-
tem’s parameter X.
 Partial-Private-Key-Extract: It takes msk, and an identity
IDi of the user i as inputs and outputs the partial private
key Di for the user i.
 Set-Secret-Value: It takes the system’s parameter X, an
identity IDi of the user i as inputs and outputs a random
number xi as the secret value of the user IDi.
 Set-Private-Key: It takes the system’s parameter X, partial
private key Di, secret value xi of the user IDi and outputs
the full private key ski of IDi.
 Set-Public-Key:It takes the system’s parameter X, secret
value xi of IDi as inputs and outputs the full public key
pki of IDi.
 CL-SDVS-Sign:It takes the system’s parameter X, full
private key ski of the signer IDi, a message
m 2 {0,1}*, full public key pkj of the designated veriﬁer
IDj as inputs and then outputs a signature r on the
message m.
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public key pki of the signer IDi, private key skj of the desig-
nated veriﬁer IDj and a message-signature pair (r,m) as
inputs and then outputs ‘true’ if the signature r is valid.
Otherwise, outputs ‘false’.
 CL-SDVS-Simulation:The designated veriﬁer IDj executes
this algorithm to produce an identical signature r0, which
is indistinguishable from the signature r generated by the
original signer IDi.
3.2. Attack model of CL-SDVS scheme
There are three types of adversaries with different capabilities
in any certiﬁcateless CL-PKC system: the Type I adversaryAI
is an outsider who can access the system’s parameters only, the
Type II adversary AII is a dishonest user, and the Type III
adversary AIII is a malicious PKG. The description of these
adversaries is given below.
 Type I adversaryAI.This type of adversary only knows the
public parameters and tries to obtain PKG’s master private
key to impersonate any user in the system.
 Type II adversary AII.This type of adversary (public key
replacement attacker) has no knowledge about users’ par-
tial-private-keys, but can replace users’ public keys with a
value of his own choice.
 Type III adversary AIII.This type of adversary (malicious
PKG) has the knowledge about users’ partial-private-keys,
but cannot replace users’ public keys.
The resilience of the attack made by the adversary AI is
related to the security of the PKG key generation and this
attack is not a strong attack, while the adaptive chosen mes-
sage and identity attack caused by other two adversaries are
considered as powerful attacks. The existential unforgeability
of a CL-SDVS scheme against the adaptive chosen message
and identity attack is deﬁned (Yum and Lee, 2004; Hu
et al., 2006; Yap et al., 2006; Zhang et al., 2006; Zhang
and Feng, 2006; Huang et al., 2006; Choi et al., 2007; Du
and Wen, 2007; Zhang and Zhang, 2008; Chen et al.,
2008) by the following challenge-response games Game 1
and Game 2 played between a challenger C and the adver-
sary AII or AIII.
Game 1: The challenger C plays this game with an adaptive
chosen message and identity adversary AII for breaking CL-
SDVS scheme.
 Setup: The challenger C takes the security parameter k 2 Zþ
and runs the setup algorithm to generate the PKG’s secret
key msk and the system’s parameter X. Then C sends X
to AII while keeping msk secret.
 Hash queries: The adversaryAII can request the hash value
for any input.
 Partial-Private-Key-Extract queries: The adversary AII
can ask for the partial private key of the user IDi, C
then computes the corresponding Di and sends it to
AII.
 Set-Secret-Value queries: The adversaryAII can ask for the
secret value of the user IDi, C then computes the corre-
sponding secret value xi and sends it to AII. Set-Public-Key queries: The adversary AII can asks for the
full public key of the user IDi, C then computes the corre-
sponding pki and send it to AII.
 Public-Key-Replacement queries: The adversary AII can
choose a new public key P 0i for the user IDi and asks to
replace the old public key Pi by P
0
i. Then AII sets P
0
i as
the new public key of IDi and C records it.
 CL-SDVS-Sign queries: The adversary AII can ask for a
signature of the chosen message mi with signer’s identity
IDi and designated veriﬁer’s identity IDj. Then C executes
CL-SDVS-Sign algorithm and outputs a message-signature
pair (mi,ri) and returns it to AII .
 CL-SDVS-Verify queries: The adversary AII can ask for
the veriﬁcation of a message-signature pair (mi,ri) with
signer’s identity IDi and veriﬁer’s identity IDj, C then runs
CL-SDVS-Verify algorithm and outputs true if (mi,ri) is
valid. Otherwise, outputs false.
 Forgery: At the end of game AII outputs a valid forged
tuple (m*,r*) with signer’s identity IDi and veriﬁer’s identity
IDj. The adversary AII can win the above game if the fol-
lowing holds:(a) The signature r* is a valid signature of the message m*
with signer’s identity IDi and veriﬁer’s identity IDj.
(b) The message m* has never been submitted to the CL-
SDVS-Sign oracle with signer’s identity IDi and veriﬁer’s
identity IDj.
(c) The identities IDi and IDj have never been submitted to
the oracle Partial-Private-Key-Extract and Set-Secret-
Value-Extract.
Deﬁnition 6. The probability that an adversary AII can forge
the CL-SDVS scheme under the adaptively chosen message and
identity is deﬁned as AdvCMACLSDVS;AIIðkÞ. The CL-SDVS signa-
ture scheme is secure against the polynomial time bounded
adversaryAII, if the probability of success to win game Game 1
deﬁned above is negligible, i.e., AdvCMACLSDVS;AIIðkÞ 6 e.
Game 2: This challenge-response game is played between
the challenger C and an adaptive chosen message and identity
adversary AIII.
 Setup: The challenger C takes the security parameter k 2 Zþ
and runs the setup algorithm to generate the PKG’s secret
key msk and the system’s parameter X. Then C sends X
to AIII while keeping the msk secret.
 Hash queries: The adversaryAIII can request the hash value
for any input.
 Partial-Private-Key-Extract queries: The adversaryAIII can
ask for the partial private key of the user IDi, C then com-
putes the corresponding Di and sends it to AIII.
 Set-Secret-Value queries: The adversary AIII can ask for
the secret value of the user IDi, C then computes the corre-
sponding secret value xi and sends it to AIII.
 Set-Public-Key queries: The adversary AIII can ask for the
full public key of the user IDi, C then computes the corre-
sponding pki and sends it to AIII.
 CL-SDVS-Sign queries: The adversary AIII can ask for a
signature for the chosen message mi with signer’s identity
IDi and veriﬁer’s identity IDj. Then C executes CL-SDVS-
Sign algorithm to output a message-signature pair (mi,ri)
and then returns it to AIII .
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the veriﬁcation of a message-signature pair (mi,ri) with
signer’s identity IDi and veriﬁer’s identity IDj, C then runs
CL-SDVS-Verify algorithm and outputs true if (mi,ri) is
valid. Otherwise, outputs false.
 Forgery: At the end of this game, AIII outputs a forged
tuple (m*,r*) with signer’s identity IDi and veriﬁer’s identity
IDj. The adversary AIII can win the above game if the fol-
lowing holds:
(a) The signature r* is the valid signature of the message m*
with signer’s identity IDi and veriﬁer’s identity IDj.
(b) The message m* has never been submitted to the CL-
SDVS-Sign oracle with signer’s identity IDi and veriﬁer’s
identity IDj.
(c) The identities IDi and IDj have never been submitted to
the oracles Partial Set-Secret-Value and Public-Key-
Replacement.
Deﬁnition 7. Now, we deﬁne AdvCMACLSDVS;AIIIðkÞ as the prob-
ability that an adaptively chosen message and chosen identity
adversary AIII can win the Game 2. The CL-SDVS scheme is
secure against AIII adversary if Adv
CMA
CLSDVS;AIIIðkÞ is negligi-
ble, i.e.,AdvCMACLSDVS;AIIIðkÞ 6 e.
Deﬁnition 8. The CL-SDVS scheme is existentially unforge-
able against adaptive chosen message and chosen identity
attack if it is secure against the adversaries AII and AIII,
i.e., if both AdvCMACLSDVS;AIIðkÞ 6 e and AdvCMACLSDVS;AIIIðkÞ 6 e
hold simultaneously.4. The proposed CL-SDVS scheme
In this section, we describe our secure and computationally
efﬁcient CL-SDVS scheme, which is developed based on ellip-
tic curve bilinear pairings. We assume that Alice, the original
signer with identity IDA, has the full private key skA = (-
DA,xA) and public key pkA = (QA,PA), and Bob is the desig-
nated veriﬁer who has the identity IDB, full private key
skB = (DB,xB) and full public key pkB = (QB,PB). The pro-
posed CL-SDVS scheme consists of the following algorithms:
 Setup: This algorithm takes a security parameter k 2 Zþ as
input, and returns a system’s parameter and a master key.
Given k, the PKG does the following:(a)
pri
sam
ma
(20
(b)
gro
pri
(c)
fun
H 3
cal
20
tra
H2
MChoose an additive elliptic curve cyclic group (Gq,+) of
me order qP 2k, a multiplicative group (Gm, Æ) of the
e prime order q and an admissible bilinear pairing
p e^ : Gq  Gq ! Gm as deﬁned in Boneh and Franklin
01).
Choose a number s2RZp and a generator point P of the
up Gq, and compute P0 = sP, where (s,P0 = sP) is the
vate/public key pair of PKG.
Choose three secure and one-way cryptographic hash
ctions H 1 : f0; 1g ! Gq; H 2 : f0; 1g  Gq ! Zq and
: f0; 1g  Gm  Gm ! Zq. The hash function H1 is
led the map-to-point hash function (Boneh and Franklin,
01), which is used to map a random binary string of arbi-
ry length to a point of the elliptic curve group Gq, while
and H3 are the general hash functions (i.e., SHA family,
D family, etc.).(d) The system parameters, represented by the vector
X ¼ fGq;Gm; e^; q; P ; P 0;H 1;H 2;H 3g, is known to every-
one associated with the system; however, the master
key msk= s is private and only known to PKG.
 Partial-Private-Key-Extract: This algorithm takes the sys-
tem’s parameter X, the master private key s and a user’s
identity IDi 2 {0,1}* as inputs and generates the partial pri-
vate key for the user IDi as follows:(a) Compute Qi =H1(IDi).
(b) Compute the partial private keyDi = sQi and send to the
user IDi through a secure and authenticated channel.
 Set-Secret-Value: The user IDi picks a number xi2RZq, com-
putes Pi = xiP and sets xi as his secret value.
 Set-Private-Key: The user IDi sets ski = (Di,xi) as his full
private key.
 Set-Public-Key:The user IDi sets pki = (Qi,Pi) as his full
public key.
 CL-SDVD-Sign: The signer Alice chooses a number r2RZq
and then generates a designated veriﬁer signature on a mes-
sage m 2 {0,1}* for the designated veriﬁer Bob in the fol-
lowing way:(a) Compute g ¼ e^ðDA;QBÞ and h=H2(m,xAPB).
(b) Compute R ¼ e^ðP 0;QBÞrh and t=H3(m,g,R).
(c) Compute V= rhP0 + tDA and S ¼ e^ðV ;QBÞ.
(d) Output the signature (R,S) and send to Bob for
veriﬁcation.
 CL-SDVD-Verify: On receiving the signature (R,S) and the
message m, the veriﬁer Bob does the following:
(a) Compute g ¼ e^ðQA;DBÞ and t= H3(m,g,R).
(b) Compute S00 = R Æ gt and check whether S00 = S holds.
If so, Bob accepts the signature (R,S), otherwise he rejects
the signature.
 CL-SDVS-Simulation: Bob can efﬁciently produce a valid
signature ðbR; bSÞ on a message m intended for himself as
follows:
(a) Choose a number r^2RZq, compute g^ ¼ e^ðQA;DBÞ and
h^ ¼ H 2ðm; xBPAÞ.
(b) Compute bR ¼ e^ðP 0;QBÞr^h^ and t^ ¼ H 3ðm; g^; bRÞ.
(c) Compute bS ¼ bR  gt^ and output the signature ðbR; bSÞ.
It can be veriﬁed that the simulated ðbR; bSÞ is a valid signa-
ture on a given message m.
 Correctness of the proposed scheme: Since
g ¼ e^ðDA;QBÞ ¼ e^ðQA;DBÞ and t=H3(m,g,R). Therefore,
we obtain
S ¼ e^ðV;QBÞ
¼ e^ðrhP0 þ tDA;QBÞ
¼ e^ðrhP0;QBÞe^ðtDA;QBÞ
¼ e^ðP0;QBÞrhe^ðDA;QBÞt
¼ e^ðP0;QBÞrhe^ðQA;DBÞt
¼ R  gt
This proves the correctness and soundness of the proposed
CL-SDVS scheme. h5. Security analysis of the proposed CL-SDVS scheme
In this section, we present the security proof of the proposed
CL-SDVS scheme against different adversaries with different
powers in the random oracle model (Bellare and Rogaway,
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properties such as strongness, source hiding and non-delegat-
ability of an SDVS scheme (Yang et al., 2009; Xiao et al.,
2010). Note that the security of the proposed scheme depends
on the hardness assumption of ECDLP, BDH and CDH prob-
lems in the elliptic curve group.
5.1. Unforgeability against Type I adversary
Theorem 1. The proposed CL-SDVS scheme is existentially
unforgeable against Type I adversary AI with the hardness
assumption of ECDLP in the elliptic curve group.
Proof. The adversary AI has the knowledge about system’s
parameter X ¼ fGq;Gm; e^; q;P;P0;H1;H2;H3g, where
P0 = sP. The adversary AI can impersonate any user IDi in
the system if the master private key msk= s is known to
him. Note that there is no use of certiﬁcate of the public key
Pi = xiP; therefore, knowing the maser private key msk, AI
can impersonate the user IDi by choosing a random xi of his
choice. To know s, AI tries to obtain it from the PKG’s public
key P0, however, it is computationally infeasible to derive s
from P0 due to the difﬁculties of solving the ECDLP in the
elliptic curve group Gq. As far as we know, there is no polyno-
mial time bounded algorithm so far, which can solve the
ECDLP problem with non-negligible advantage. Thus, the
proposed CL-SDVS scheme is secure against the adversary
AI under the ECDLP problem. h5.2. Unforgeability against Type II adversary (resilience against
public key replacement attack)
Theorem 2. The proposed CL-SDVS scheme is existentially
unforgeable under the adaptive chosen message and identity
attacks against the adversaryAII in random oracle model if the
BDH problem is hard to break by a polynomial time bounded
algorithm.
Proof. Assume that the probabilistic polynomial time bounded
adversaryAII who can breach our CL-SDVS scheme under the
adaptively chosen message and identity attacks in the random
oracle model with probability e and within a time bound t, then
we show that there exists an algorithm C that can use AII as
black box to solve the BDHproblemwith a non-negligible prob-
ability andwithin the polynomial time t. That is, for given a ran-
dom instance (P,aP,bP,cP) 2 Gq and for the unknowns
a; b; c2RZq; C can compute e^ðP;PÞabc. To solve the BDH prob-
lem,C setsX ¼ fGq;Gm; e^; q;P;P0 ¼ aP;H1;H2;H3g, returns it
toAII and then replies in the following way:
 Hash queries to H1: Assume that AII is allowed to ask at
most qH1 times H1 queries and C maintains an initial-empty
list LlistH1 that consists of the tuple of the form (IDi,Qi,di) to
avoid any collision and inconsistency. Suppose the adver-
sary AII asks a H1 query with IDi, C then responds as
follows:
(a)
the
(b)
adIf IDi = IDA, then return Qi = H1(IDi) = bP and add
tuple (IDi,Qi,^) to the list LlistH1.
Else, if IDi = IDB, then return Qi = H1(IDi) = cP and
d the tuple (IDi,Qi,^) to the list LlistH1.(c) Else, return Qi = H1(IDi) = diP, and add the tuple
(IDi,Qi,di) to the list L
list
H1, where di2RZq.
 Partial-Private-Key-Extract queries: The algorithm C main-
tains an initial empty-list Llistppke, which contains the tuple of
the form (IDi,Di,xi,Pi). On receiving a Partial-Private-
Key-Extract query on IDi, C ﬁrst recovers the tuple (IDi, -
Qi,di) from the list L
list
H1 and then replies as follows:(a) If (IDi = IDA, IDB), then C aborts the protocol
execution.
(b) Else (IDi „ IDA, IDB), C executes the following:
– If the list Llistppke contains a tuple (IDi,Di,xi,Pi) and if
Di „ ^, C then returns Di as answer to AII. Else, C
chooses a number di2RZq and returns Di = di(aP)
as the partial private key to IDi, and then adds it to
the list Llistppke.
– If the list Llistppke does not contain a tuple (IDi,Di,xi,Pi),
C then chooses a number di2RZq and returns Di =
di(aP) to IDi. Afterwards, C sets (xi,Pi) = (^,^)
and includes (IDi,Di,xi,Pi) in the list L
list
ppke.
 Public-Key-Extract queries: When AII submits a Public-
Key-Extract query for the user IDi, C searches the list
Llistppke for a tuple (IDi,Di,xi,Pi), which is indexed by IDi
and then returns the output as follows:
(a) If a tuple (IDi,Di,xi,Pi) is found in the list L
list
ppke and
– If Pi „ ^, then C returns Pi as an answer.
– Else (Pi = ^), C chooses a number xi2RZq, computes
Pi = xiP, returns Pi as an answer and then inserts
(xi,Pi) into the list L
list
ppke.
(b) Else (there is no such (IDi,Di,xi,Pi) in L
list
ppkeÞ; C chooses
a xi2RZq, sets Di = ^ and Pi = xiP, outputs Pi as an answer
and inserts the tuple (xi,Pi) to the list L
list
ppke.
 Set-Secret-Value queries: Assume that AII asks a Set-
Secret-Value query for the user IDi, C ﬁrst looks into the list
Llistppke and then replies in the following way:
(a) If (IDi = IDA, IDB), then C aborts the simulation.
(b) Else (IDi „ IDA, IDB), C searches the list Llistppke and
– If the list Llistppke contains a tuple of the form (IDi,Di,x-
i,Pi), C checks whether Di = ^ holds. If so, C exe-
cutes the Partial-Private-Key-Extract query to
obtain Di. If Pi = ^, C executes the Public-Key-
Extract query to obtain (xi,Pi = xiP). Then, C
returns xi and adds the full private key (Di,xi) to
the list Llistppke.
– Else, (there is no tuple such (IDi,Di,xi,Pi) in L
list
ppkeÞ; C
executes the Partial-Private-Key-Extract query to
obtain Di and the Public-Key-Extract query to obtain
(xi,Pi). Then, C returns xi and adds the full private
key (Di,xi) to the list L
list
ppke.
 Public-Key-Replacement queries: Suppose the adversaryAII
makes a Public-Key-Replacement query on ðIDi; P 0iÞ; C then
searches the list Llistppke and returns the output as follows:
(a) If the list Llistppke contains a tuple of the form (IDi,Di,xi,
Pi), C sets P i ¼ P 0i ¼ x0iP and then updates the tuple (IDi,
Di,xi,Pi) to IDi;Di; x0i; P
0
i
 
.
(b) Else (there is no such tuple in the list LlistppkeÞ; C sets
Di ¼?; P i ¼ P 0i ¼ x0iP and then adds the tuple
IDi;?; x0i; P 0i
 
to the list Llistppke.
 Hash queries to H2: The algorithm C maintains an initial-
empty list LlistH2, which contains the tuple of the form
(IDi, IDj,mi,R1i,hi) and AII is allowed to ask at most qH2
times H2 queries. If AII requests a H2 hash value for
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identity IDj, C returns the outputs in the following way:
(a) If (IDi, IDj,mi,R1i,hi) is found in the list L
list
H2; C then
outputs hi as an answer.
(b) Else (no such tuple is found there), C chooses a num-
ber hi2RZq, returns it as the answer and inserts the tuple
(IDi, IDj,mi,R1i,hi) into the list L
list
H2.
 Hash queries to H3: We assume thatAII can askH3 queries
at most qH3 times andCmaintains an initial-empty list L
list
H3 of
tuple (IDi, IDj,mi,gi,Ri, ti). WhenAIImakes aH3 queries on
(mi,gi,Ri) with the signer identity IDi and designated veri-
ﬁer’s identity IDj, C returns the answer as follows:
(a) If a tuple (IDi, IDj, mi, gi, Ri, ti) exists in L
list
H3; C then
returns ti as the output.
(b) Else, C chooses a ti2RZq, returns it as the answer and
then adds (IDi, IDj,mi,gi,Ri, ti) to the list L
list
H3.
 CL-SDVD-Sign queries: Assume that AII can ask at most
qS times CL-SDV-Sign queries to C. When AII asks for a
signature on a chosen message mi 2 {0,1}* with the signer’s
identity IDi and designated veriﬁer’s identity IDj, C then
responds as follows:(a) If IDi „ IDA and IDj „ IDB, C computes the private key
(Di,xi) = (di(aP), xi) of IDi, chooses a number ri2RZq,
the values hi, ti from the lists L
list
H2 and L
list
H3, respectively,
and then computes the signature as given below:
– Compute gi ¼ e^ðDi;QjÞ and set H2(mi,xiPj) = hi
– Compute Ri ¼ e^ðP 0;QjÞrihi and setH3(mi,gi,Ri) = ti.
– Compute Vi = rihiP0 + tiDi and Si ¼ e^ðV i;QjÞ.
– Output the signature (Ri,Si).
(b) If IDj „ IDB and IDi „ IDA, C computes IDj’s private
key (Dj,xj) = (dj(aP),xj), chooses a number rj2RZq, col-
lects the values hj,tj from the lists L
list
H2 and L
list
H3, respec-
tively, and then computes the signature as follows:
– Compute gj ¼ e^ðQi;DjÞ and set H2(mi, xjPi) = hj.
–ComputeRj ¼ e^ðP 0;QjÞrjhj and setH3(mi,gj,Rj) = tj.
– Compute Sj ¼ Rj  gtjj and output the signature
(Rj,Sj).
(c) Otherwise, abort the protocol’s execution.
 CL-SDVS-Verify queries: Assume thatAII can ask at most
qV times CL-SDVD-Verify queries to C. WhenAII makes a
CL-SDVS-Verify query on the input signature (R,S) with
the signer’s identity IDi and designated veriﬁer’s identity
IDj, C checks whether (IDi, IDj) = (IDA, IDB) or (IDi, IDj)
= (IDB, IDA) holds.(a)
(b)(a) If it holds, C aborts the protocol execution.
(b) Else, C computes the private key (Dj,xj) = (dj (aP),xj)
of IDj and veriﬁes the signature using the proposed
CL-SDVS-Verify algorithm.
 Forgery: Finally, the adversaryAII generates a valid forged
signature (R*,S*) on a chosen message m* for the signer’s
identity IDi and designated veriﬁer’s identity IDj with
non-negligible probability. If (IDi, IDj) „ (IDA, IDB) or
(IDi, IDj) „ (IDB, IDA) holds, C outputs ‘failure’ and termi-
nates the protocol execution; otherwise outputs a valid sig-
nature (R*,S*) with t* on the chosen message m*. Therefore,
from the valid signature (R*,S*), C can compute
S ¼ R  eðQA;SBÞt

) eðQA;SBÞ ¼ ðS=RÞ1=t

) eðbP; acPÞ ¼ ðS=RÞ1=t
) eðP;PÞabc ¼ ðS=RÞ1=tThus, the BDH problem eðP;PÞabc ¼ ðS=RÞ1=t is solved for
the given random tuple (P,aP,bP,cP) 2 Gq, where
a; b; c2RZq are unknown to C. However, it is known that the
BDH problem is unsolvable by any probabilistic polynomial
time bounded algorithm, and hence, our CL-SDVS scheme is
secure in the random oracle model under the adaptive chosen
message and identity attacks against the adversary AII. h5.3. Unforgeability against Type III adversary (resilience
against malicious PKG attack)
Theorem 3. The proposed CL-SDVS scheme is existentially
unforgeable against the adversary AIII under the adaptive
chosen message and identity attacks in the random oracle model
provided the CDH problem is intractable in the elliptic curve
group Gq.
Proof. Suppose that an adversaryAIII can forge the proposed
CL-SDVS scheme with probability e and within a time bound
t, then there exists a probabilistic polynomial time bounded
algorithm C, which can solve an instance of the CDH problem
with non-negligible probability. That is, for given a random
instance (P,aP,bP) 2 Gq, where a; b2RZq; C outputs abP. To
solve the CDH problem, C selects a number k2RZq and sets
the system’s parameter X ¼ fGq;Gm; e^; q;P;P0 ¼ kP;H1;H2;
H3g, returns (X,k) to AIII and then answers AIII’s queries in
the following way. In order to avoid collisions and consistently
respond toAIII’s queries, C keeps an initial-empty Partial-Pri-
vate-Key-Extract list Llistppke, which consists of a tuple of the
form (IDi,xi,Pi).
 Hash queries to H1: Assume that AIII can ask at most qH1
times H1 queries to C. The algorithm C maintains an initial-
empty list LlistH1 that contains the tuple of the form (IDi,Qi,di).
WhenAIII makes a H1 query on IDi, C behaves as follows:
(a) Search the list LlistH1 and respond with the previous value
di if a tuple (IDi, Qi, di) is found.
(b) Else, return Qi = H1(IDi) = diP, and include the tuple
(IDi,Qi,di) into the list L
list
H1, where di2RZq.
 Public-Key-Extract queries: When AIII queries on input
IDi, C searches the list L
list
ppke and answers as follows:(a) If the list Llistppke contains a tuple of the form (IDi,xi,Pi)
and
– If IDi = IDA, C returns Pi = aP as an answer and
inserts (IDi,^,Pi) into Llistppke.
– If IDi = IDB, C returns Pi = bP as an answer and
inserts (IDi,^,Pi) into Llistppke.
– If IDi „ IDA, IDB, C returns the previous Pi as the
answer.
(b) Else (there is no such tuple), C picks a number xi2RZq,
returns Pi = xiP as the answer and then adds the tuple
(IDi,xi,Pi) to the list L
list
ppke.
 Set-Secret-Value queries: When AIII asks for a Set-Secret-
Value query with IDi, C performs as follows:If (IDi = IDA, IDB), then C terminates the process.
Else (IDi „ IDA, IDB), C searches the list Llistppke and
answers as follows:
– If the list Llistppke contains a tuple (IDi,xi,Pi) and if
Pi = ^, C executes the Public-Key-Extract query in
order to obtain (IDi,xi,Pi), returns xi as the answer
and inserts the tuple (IDi,xi,Pi) to the list L
list
ppke.
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cutes the Public-Key-Extract query to obtain (IDi,x-
i,Pi). Subsequently,C saves the value and adds the
secret key xi to the list L
list
ppke.
 Hash queries to H2: The adversary AIII is allowed to ask
utmost qH2 times H2 queries to C. The algorithm C main-
tains an initial-empty list LlistH2 that contains tuples of the
form (IDi, IDj,mi,R1i,hi). When AIII makes H2 queries on
(mi,R1i) with the signer identity IDi and designated veriﬁer’s
identity IDj, C returns the previous value from the list L
list
H2 if
a tuple of the form (IDi, IDj, mi,R1i,hi) is found; otherwise,
it chooses a hi2RZq, returns it as the answer and then adds
(IDi, IDj,mi,R1i,hi) to the list L
list
H2.
 Hash queries to H3: The adversary AIII is allowed to ask
utmost qH3 times H3 queries to C. The algorithm C main-
tains an initial-empty list LlistH3 that contains tuples of the
form (IDi, IDj,mi,gi,Ri, ti). When AIII makes H3 queries
on (mi,gi,Ri) with the signer identity IDi and designated ver-
iﬁer’s identity IDj, C returns the previous value ti from L
list
H3
if a tuple of the form (IDi, IDj,mi,gi,Ri, ti) existed; other-
wise, C chooses a number ti2RZq, returns it as the answer
and then adds the tuple (IDi, IDj,mi,gi,Ri, ti) into the list
LlistH3.
 CL-SDVD-Sign queries: Assume that AIII can ask at most
qS times CL-SDV-Sign queries to C. When AIII asks for a
signature on message mi 2 {0,1}* chosen by him with the
signer’s identity IDi and designated veriﬁer’s identity IDj,
C responds as follows:
(a) If IDi „ IDA and IDj „ IDB, C computes the private key
(Di,xi) = (k(diP), xi) of IDi, chooses a number ri2RZq,
recovers hi and ti from the lists L
list
H2 and L
list
H3 respectively,
and then computes the signature as follows:
– Compute gi ¼ e^ðDi;QjÞ and set H2(mi,xiPj) = hi.
– Compute Ri ¼ e^ðP 0;QjÞrihi and setH3(mi,gi,Ri) = ti.
– Compute Vi = rihiP0 + tiDi and Si ¼ e^ðV i;QjÞ.
– Output the signature (Ri,Si).
(b) If IDj „ IDB and IDi „ IDA, C computes the private key
(Dj,xj) = (k(djP), xj) of IDj, chooses a number ri2RZq,
recovers hi and ti from the lists L
list
H2 and L
list
H3 respectively,
and then computes the signature as follows:
– Compute gj ¼ e^ðQi;DjÞ and set H2(mi,xjPi) = hj.
– ComputeRj ¼ e^ðP 0;QjÞrjhj and setH3(mi,gj,Rj) = tj.
– Compute Sj ¼ Rj  gtjj and output the signature
(Rj,Sj).
(c) Otherwise, terminate the protocol execution.
 CL-SDVS-Verify queries: Assume thatAIII can ask at most
qV times CL-SDVD-Verify queries to C. When AIII makes
a CL-SDVS-Verify query on the input signature (R,S) with
the signer’s identity IDi and veriﬁer’s identity IDj, then C
checks whether (IDi, IDj) = (IDA, IDB) or (IDi, IDj) = (ID-
B, IDA) holds.
(a) If it holds, C terminates the protocol execution.
(b) Otherwise, C computes the private key
(Dj,xj) = (rj(kP ),xj) of IDj to verify the signature by
using the CL-SDVS-Verify algorithm.
 Forgery: Eventually, the adversary AIII outputs a valid
forged signature (R*,S*) on the chosen message m* for the
signer IDi and designated veriﬁer IDj with non-negligible
probability. If (IDi, IDj) „ (IDA, IDB) or (IDi, IDj) „ (ID-
B, IDA) holds, C outputs ‘failure’ and stops the protocol exe-
cution. Otherwise, C searches the list LlistH2 for the tuple of theform m; xi P

j ; h

i
 
. If no such tuple is found, C outputs
‘failure’; otherwise, C outputs abP ¼ xi P j as the solution
of the CDH problem.
Hence, C breaks the CDH problem for given (P,aP,bP) 2 Gq,
where a; b2RZq are unknown. Thus, the proposed CL-SDVS
scheme is secure in the random oracle model under the adaptive
chosen message and identity attacks against the adversary
AIII. h
Theorem 4. The proposed CL-SDVS scheme satisﬁes the
strongness, source hiding and non-delegatability properties of a
strong designate veriﬁer signature scheme.
Proof. The proposed CL-SDVS scheme is a strong designated
veriﬁer signature scheme. For the veriﬁcation of the signature
(R,S), the private key skB= (DB,xB) of Bob (designated veri-
ﬁer) is required and thus, an outsider can neither verify the sig-
nature (R,S) nor prove that Alice (original signer) or Bob has
generated the signature. Therefore, the strongness property is
satisﬁed in our proposed CL-DSVS scheme. It can be noted
that Bob can generate a simulated signature ð bR; bSÞ, which is
indistinguishable from the normal signature (R,S) created by
Alice. Therefore, an outsider cannot identify that (R,S) is
signed by Alice or Bob even if all the private keys are known.
Thus, the source hiding property is achieved in our scheme. In
addition, Bob cannot prove to an outsider that the signature
(R,S) is computed either by him or Alice. Suppose that (R0,S0)
is chosen at random from the set of all valid signatures designed
for Bob, then the probability Pr[(R,S) = (R0,S0)] = 1/(q  1),
since the signature (R,S) is computed based on the integer r,
which is chosen randomly from the set Zq. Similarly, we can
write Pr½ð bR; bSÞ ¼ ðR0;S0Þ ¼ 1=ðq 1Þ. Therefore, the simu-
lated signature and the original signature have the identical dis-
tribution, and thus, they are indistinguishable from each other.
Hence, the proposed CL-SDVS scheme satisﬁes the non-deleg-
atability property through the CL-SDVS-Simulation
algorithm. h
For a further security discussion, three trust levels, deﬁned
by Girault (1992) to reduce the degree of trust that users need
to have in the PKG, can easily be achieved in our proposed
CL-SDVS scheme. The Theorems 2 and 3 discussed earlier
conﬁrm that the proposed scheme achieves Girault’s ﬁrst two
trust levels 1 and 2. The discussions about the Girult’s trust le-
vel 3 made by Al-Riyami and Paterson (2003) and Gorantla
and Saxena (2005) indicate that the adversary AIII(i.e.,
untrusted PKG) can still impersonate a user IDi without know-
ing the corresponding secret key xi, i.e., the PKG can forge a
valid signature by replacing the original public key Pi = xiP
with a fake public key P00i ¼ x00i P of its own choice. Because
the PKG can calculate the partial private key Di = sQi and
generate another valid key pair ðDi;P00i Þ for the user IDi, so
the PKG can impersonate the valid user IDi without being de-
tected, and it happened because the user with IDi can also gen-
erate another valid key pair ðDi; P0iÞ corresponding to the
partial private key Di as the partial private key Di and the pub-
lic key Pi are generated independently. Note that this type of
attack may occur only by the adversary who has access to
the PKG’s master private keys, i.e., Type III adversary AIII
in our scheme as deﬁned earlier.
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using the alternate key generation technique as described in
Section 5.1 of Al-Riyami and Paterson (2003). In this tech-
nique, a user IDi ﬁrst generates his secret value and the cor-
responding public key as xi and Pi = xiP respectively, and
makes a partial-private-key request with (IDi,Pi) to the
PKG. Then PKG calculates the partial private key as Di = s-
Qi, where Qi =H1 (IDi,Pi) is the corresponding public key. It
can be noted that the user IDi has only one partial private
key Di corresponding to the public key Pi = xiP and he can-
not create another public key P0i ¼ x0iP while keeping the
same partial private key Di. The user IDi can do so if he
knows the PKG’s master private key msk= s, which is
impossible as proven in theorem 1. Note that the PKG still
can create another pair ðDi;P00i Þ for the user IDi; however,
the impersonation of any user by the PKG can easily be de-
tected because this is its only ability. Thus, our CL-SDVS
scheme also meets the trust level 3.6. Comparison of the proposed scheme with others
This section compares the proposed CL-SDVS scheme with
other competitive ones in terms of security, computation and
communication aspects. Recently, Cao et al. (2010) has esti-
mated the running time of different cryptographic operations
such as elliptic curve bilinear pairing, elliptic curve scalar point
multiplication and elliptic curve bilinear pairing-based expo-
nentiation operations using MIRACAL software (Shamus
Software Ltd.) implemented on a Pentium IV 3 GHZ proces-
sor with 512 MB RAM and the Windows XP operating sys-
tem. Table 1 shows the experimental running time of
different cryptographic operations obtained by Cao et al.
(2010). Since the proposed scheme mainly uses four operationsTable 1 Notation, description and running time (ms) of different c
Notations Descriptions
TEM Time complexity for exe
TBP Time complexity for exe
TPX Time complexity for exe
TEA Time complexity for exe
Table 2 The performance comparison of the proposed scheme with
Schemes/parameters Computing time Runnin
time (m
Chen et al. (2007) 6TBP + 13TEM 171.10
Yang et al.’s, 2007 4TBP + 8 TEM 131.08
Hongzhen and Qiaoyan (2009) 3TBP + 8 TEM + 1TPX 122.27
Gorantla and Saxena (2005) 4TBP + 6 TEM 118.32
Xiao et al. (2010) 2TBP + 6 TEM + 1TPX 102.26
Xu et al. (2008) 2TBP + 8 TEM 91.06
Yang et al. (2009) 2TBP + 8 TEM 91.06
Zhang and Zhang (2008) 2TBP + 7TEM 84.68
Choi et al. (2007) 2TBP + 7TEM 84.68
Li and Liu (2011) 2TBP + 6TEM 78.30
Proposed 1TBP + 4TEM + 2TPX 67.93
BDH: Bilinear Difﬁe-Hellman Problem; CDH: Computational Difﬁe-He
scheme.as mentioned in Table 1, the running cost of the proposed tech-
nique is estimated as follows: where the time required for sys-
tem parameters is not considered as a trusted third party, PKG
generates them once in the background mode. In the proposed
scheme, the map-to-point hash function (Boneh and Franklin,
2001) is avoided in the signature generation and veriﬁcation
phases, which helps to improve the overall performance of
our scheme. It can be noted that both the signer and veriﬁer
can pre-compute e^ðDA;QBÞ and e^ðP0;QBÞ, and therefore, these
two computations are ignored in the comparison part. In our
scheme, the signature generation and veriﬁcation algorithms
execute one bilinear pairing, four scalar point multiplications
and two pairing-based exponentiations and thus, the total
computing time is (1TBP + 4TEM + 2TPX) and the running
time according to Table 1 is (20.01 + 6.38 ·
4 + 11.20 · 2)  67.93 ms. Similarly, the running time of other
methods are calculated and shown in Table 2, which shows
that the proposed scheme is the most computationally efﬁcient.
It is to be noted that the time needed to execute the addition of
any two elliptic curve points is neglected, since its computation
time is very small (Chung et al., 2007).
In order to assess the communication efﬁciency, we follow
the same reasoning made by Cao et al. (2010) that for achiev-
ing the 1024-bit RSA level of security, the pairing-based
schemes employ the Tate pairing (Boneh and Franklin, 2001)
deﬁned over the super singular elliptic curve E/Fp:y
2 = x3 + x
(Miller, 1985; Koblitz, 1987) with embedding degree 2, where q
is a 160-bit Solinas prime q= 2159 + 217 + 1 and p is at least a
512-bit prime number satisfying the relation p+ 1= 12qr
(Solinas, 2011) for the said ﬁeld; whereas to meet the same le-
vel of security, the pairing-free ECC-based schemes use Ko-
blitz elliptic curve y2 = x3 + ax2 + b (Koblitz, 1987) deﬁned
over the ﬁeld F1632 of prime numbers with a= 1 and b is a
163-bit random prime number. Thus, a 163-bit random num-ryptographic operations.
cuting the elliptic curve scalar point multiplication, 1TEM  6.38 ms
cuting the bilinear pairing operation, 1TBP  20.01 ms
cuting pairing-based exponentiation, 1TPX  11.20 ms
cuting the addition of two elliptic curve points, which is negligable
other related schemes.
g
s)
Signature length
(byte)
Complexity
assumptions
Is SDVS
scheme
128 BDH No
128 BDH No
192 CDH No
128 BDH No
128 BDH & CDH Yes
128 CDH No
128 BDH & CDH Yes
128 CDH No
128 CDH No
128 BDH No
128 BDH & CDH Yes
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60 SK Haﬁzul Islam, G.P. Biswasber in a pairing-free scheme is equivalent in security with a
512-bit random number in a pairing-based scheme. In our
scheme, since the ﬁnal signature consists of two elliptic curve
points from the pairing-based group of super singular elliptic
curve E/Fp: y
2 = x3 + x, the length of the signature is
(512 + 512)/8 = 128 bytes as shown in Table 2.
Finally, the security comparison of the different schemes is
done and Table 2 indicates that the two schemes correspond-
ing to Yang et al. (2009) and Xiao et al. (2010), including
our proposed one are CL-SDVS scheme, whereas the rest are
only CLS schemes. We also list different signature schemes
and their demerits in Table 3, which demonstrates that Xiao
et al. scheme (2010) is insecure against all types of adversaries
present in the CL-PKC system, but Yang et al. (2009) and our
CL-SDVS scheme offer provable security in the random oracle
model (Bellare and Rogaway, 1993). Thus, compared with
existing schemes, the proposed scheme is computationally efﬁ-
cient, provably secure and more suitable for practical
applications.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, an efﬁcient and secure CL-SDVS scheme using
elliptic curve cryptography and bilinear pairings has been pro-
posed. The proposed scheme achieves different trust levels de-
ﬁned by Girault in order to reduce the degree of trust that
users need to have in the PKG. The scheme also satisﬁes the
necessary security properties of strong designated veriﬁer sig-
natures in the CL-PKC system. It has been shown that the pro-
posed scheme is unforgeable under the adaptive chosen
message and identity attacks against various adversaries in
the random oracle model based on the intractability of BDH
and CDH assumptions, which assures a wider applicability
in various applications.Table 3 The security comparison of the proposed scheme
with other related schemes.
Schemes/attacks Resilience against AII
adversary (public key
replacement attack)
Resilience against
AIII adversary
(malicious
PKG attack)
Yum and Lee (2004) No Yes
Gorantla and Saxena
(2005)
No Yes
Huang et al. (2006) Yes No
Yap et al. (2006) No Yes
Chen et al. (2007) No Yes
Du and Wen (2007) No Yes
Xu et al. (2008) Yes No
Xiao et al. (2010) No No
Choi et al. (2011) No Yes
Proposed Yes Yes
Adversary AII: the adversary AII has no knowledge about users’
partial-private-keys, but can replace users’ public keys with a value
of his own choice.Adversary AIII: the adversary AIII has the
knowledge about users’ partial-private-keys, but cannot replace
users’ public keys.Yes: resists the attack.No: does not resist the
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